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Abstract 
 
We study whether the adoption of the Euro and a single monetary policy have brought 
about a change in the monetary transmission mechanism and between the interactions of 
monetary policy, fiscal policy and financial stress in the Euro area. We find that the 
stylized facts of monetary transmission remain valid, but the response of output and, 
especially, fiscal and financial stress variables to a monetary policy shock, seems to be 
stronger in the post-EMU period. Regarding fiscal and financial stress shocks, the 
inclusion in the post-EMU period of subprime and sovereign debt crises yields, changes, 
not only in the scale, but also in the patterns of the responses of our model’s main 
variables. 
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1. Introduction 
On December 31
st
, 1998, the conversion rates between the 11 participating national 
currencies and the Euro were fixed. On the following day, January 1
st
, 1999, the Euro 
became the official currency of the 11 countries in Europe
1
, and a single monetary 
policy was introduced under the authority of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Adopting the Euro as a single currency was a culmination point of several decades of 
economic and financial integration between European countries, and it marked the third 
and final stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
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However, since the beginning of the process that led to the establishment of a single 
currency in Europe, there has been extensive discussion as to whether a single monetary 
policy would be suitable for the countries that adhere to the Euro, considering their 
differences in economic, financial and social structures.  
For some time, such fundamental discussion took place mostly amongst academic 
and political circles in Europe and also in the USA. However, with the recent advent of 
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe after the 2008-2009 subprime crises, this discussion 
is ever more present in the common European citizen’s everyday talk. Therefore, the 
referred culmination point may not be the final word on monetary integration in Europe 
and further developments are to be expected. 
One of the fundamental aspects of the Euro, is the existence of a single monetary 
policy for the Euro area, conducted under the authority of the ECB. The Monetary 
Transmission Mechanism (MTM) is the process through which monetary policy affects 
real variables and prices in the economy and thus the understanding of this mechanism 
is pivotal to examining the single monetary policy under the ECB. 
15 years have now passed the adoption of the Euro, and 12 years since the entry into 
circulation of Euro coins and banknotes.
3
 With the benefit of hindsight, we will try to 
                                                          
1
 The eleven founding countries of the Euro were: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Since then, other countries have adopted the 
Euro: Greece joined in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2008, Estonia in 
2011 and Latvia in 2014. 
2
 For the historical perspective on the economic and monetary integration in Europe see, amongst others, 
Apel (1998) and Ungerer (1997). 
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assess whether the adoption of a single monetary policy has brought about a change in 
the MTM of the Euro area. Our perspective is Euro area wide and we will use a 
quarterly data sample from Q1 1987 to Q4 2011, to study the transmission mechanism 
pre, and post, Euro. The methodological approach will be a vector auto regression 
(VAR) model.  
Furthermore, bearing in mind the impact of the subprime financial crisis and the 
sovereign-debt crisis in the Euro area in more recent years, we study at a macro-level 
the interactions between monetary policy, fiscal policy and stress in the financial sector 
for the area as a whole. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the related literature; 
Section 3 reviews the econometric framework; Section 4 presents the data, the variables 
and the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
2.1. Monetary Transmission Mechanism related VARs 
The process of establishing a single currency in Europe has, since the very 
beginning, generated ample discussions amongst economists as to whether a single 
monetary policy would be suitable for the countries that adhere to the Euro, and as to 
what could be the impacts of such a single policy. The economic literature on the MTM 
in Europe can be divided in two main approaches. One approach focuses on the MTM 
of the individual countries of the Euro area, i.e., on a country by country basis. Other 
studies follow an area wide perspective, i.e., they study the transmission mechanism of 
the Euro area as a whole. Both approaches have been used to analyze the transmission 
mechanism prior to, and after, Stage Three of the EMU.
4
 
In 1999, the ECB launched a research initiative to study the transmission of 
monetary policy in the Euro area. Angeloni et al. (2003a) have an overall compilation of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3
 For the first three years, the Euro was only used for accounting purposes and did not have a physical 
existence. The Euro coins and banknotes were introduced in 1 January 2002. 
4
 Other branches of literature focus on different specific channels of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. These are out of the scope of this paper. For good reviews of the literature related to different 
transmission channels see, for instance, Boivin et al. (2010) and Weber et al. (2009). 
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several papers that were produced with this aim, and in Angeloni et al. (2003b) a 
complete summary and discussion of the main findings is provided. 
Following the ECB’s initiative, around the turn of the century, several authors 
focused their research on uncovering the stylized facts of the MTM in Europe and, in 
some cases, attempted to envisage the consequences for such mechanism of a single 
monetary policy. For instance, Mojon and Peersman (2003), following a country by 
country approach, find that the effects of monetary policy on GDP and prices were 
broadly similar in the individual countries of the Euro area. This indicates that monetary 
policy transmission might be similar between those countries before the EMU. Guiso et 
al. (1999) focus on whether a common monetary policy for the Euro area would have 
asymmetrical effects in the different countries and have a good literature overview on 
the topic. They report some significant differences across countries in several indicators 
that may matter for monetary transmission, even if no definitive conclusion seemed to 
be possible at the time. Peersman (2004) provides a comprehensive review of pre-EMU 
literature on cross-country comparisons.  
Smets and Peersman (2003), following an area-wide approach, find that a temporary 
rise in the nominal and real short-term interest rate tended to be followed by a real 
appreciation of the exchange rate, a temporary fall in output and that prices seemed to 
be more sluggish and only started to fall significantly below zero, several quarters after 
changes in GDP. Reassuringly, these results were very similar to those obtained for the 
US economy, using similar methodologies.  
In recent years, researchers have begun to assess monetary policy by the ECB, that 
is, the single monetary policy in the Euro area after 1999. This has been possible 
because the common monetary policy in the Euro area is now about 15 years old, 
therefore, using the latest available data, econometric studies based on time series are 
now starting to become more robust.  
Weber et al. (2009) investigate if there has been a significant change in the overall 
MTM, by estimating a standard VAR for the Euro area, and by endogenously searching 
for possible break dates. They report a significant break point around 1996 and some 
4 
 
evidence for a second one around 1999, concluding that monetary transmission after 
1998 is not very different from that of before 1996, but probably very different 
compared to the interim period of 1996 - 1999, which is indicative of a possible period 
of adjustment, prior to the Euro. Moreover, they find that the stylized facts of monetary 
policy transmission remain valid. Boivin, Giannoni and Mojon (2009) report important 
heterogeneity across countries
5
 in the effect of monetary shocks before the launch of the 
Euro and conclude that the creation of the Euro has contributed to a greater 
homogeneity of the transmission mechanism across countries and an overall reduction 
in the effects of monetary shocks. 
In the past couple of years, various authors included the subprime crisis period in 
their analysis and, in some instances, the more recent sovereign debt crisis. However, 
these analyses are mostly focused on the effects of the unconventional monetary policy 
measures that have been taken since.
6
 
Tables 1 and 2 present a brief systematic summary of the empirical literature on the 
MTM, pre, and post-EMU. We identify the period of the analysis, the sample, the 
methodology, the variables included in the empirical models and then, finally, the main 
conclusions.  
Regarding methodology, the seminal work of Sims (1980) was the precursor for the 
use of VAR models for the analysis of monetary policy and these models have been, 
and still are, a widely used framework for the study of the MTM. VAR models provide 
an empirical method for capturing the dynamic relations between economic variables 
(time series), without the need to impose rigid identification restrictions. This 
characteristic of the framework allows for more flexibility and less a priori theorization. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 The authors constructed a FAVAR, using data from the six largest countries of the Euro area. 
6
 See, regarding this point, as an example, Peersman (2011), Giannone et al. (2011) and Giannone et al. 
(2012). 
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Table 1 – Related literature overview (pre-EMU sample) 
 
 
Authors
Data frequency / 
Period
Sample Methodology Variables Main conclusions
Pre-EMU: Guiso, 
Kashyap, 
Pannetta, 
Terlizzese 
(1999)
The study was 
centred on cross-
country 
microeconomic 
data of June 1999.
UK, Germany, 
Italy, 
France, 
Spain, 
Netherlands, 
Belgium
n/a
- the authors 
conduct a mainly 
descriptive 
discussion based on 
microeconomic data 
from 7 selected 
countries.
13 microeconomic variables, 
including:
- employment protection 
indicator
- capital output ratio
- fraction of financing that is 
short term
- exports outside EU-15 
relative to GDP
- firms' leverage
- household indebtness
- market capitalization 
relative to GDP
- average bank size
The authors assess whether what appears 
to be large structural differences in the 
economic and financial structures of the 
various countries can lead to differences 
in the transmission mechanism. They find 
significant differences across countries in 
several indicators that may matter for 
monetary transmission, therefore 
assymetries may be in place for several 
years. However, no definitive conclusions 
can be made and several gaps remain to 
be filled, namely with relation to how 
countries would respond to the same 
temporal sequence of monetary policy 
shocks, holding fixed the exchange rate 
among them.
Peersman
, Smets 
(2003)
quarterly data
1980:Q1 - 1998:Q4
lags=3
Euro Area 
(area wide)
VAR
- variables in levels
- shocks 
identification: 
Choleski [the authors 
test for alternative 
identification 
schemes: Sims e Zha 
(1998); Gali (1992)]
- the authors 
conduct Chow tests 
for instability at the 
model after 1990:Q1.
4 endogeneous variables: 
- real GDP
- consumer prices
- domestic nominal short-
term interest rate
- real effective exchange rate
3 exogenous variables:
- world commodity price 
index
- US real GDP
- US nominal short-term 
interest rate
The authors show that the overall 
macroeconomic effects of a monetary 
policy shock in the euro area are very 
similar to those estimated for the US and 
are stable over time.
They also examine how various real and 
financial variables (GDP components, 
monetary variables, asset prices, labour 
market variables) respond to an area-wide 
impulse.  
Mojon, 
Peersman 
(2003)
quarterly data
1980:Q1 - 1998:Q4
lags=2 or 3
Germany; 
Austria, 
Belgium and 
Netherlands; 
Finland, 
France,  
Greece, 
Ireland, Italy 
and Spain
VAR
- variables in levels
- three identification 
schemes are used, 
depending on each 
country monetary 
integration with 
Germany (which is 
considered the 
nominal anchor of 
the ERM).
4 endogeneous variablesl:
- real GDP
- consumer prices
- domestic nominal short-
term  interest rate
 - real effective exchange rate
3 exogenous variables:
- world commodity price 
index
- US real GDP
- US nominal short-term 
interest rate
The authors find that the hypotheses that 
the effects of monetary policy on GDP and 
on prices are broadly similar in the 
individual countries of the euro area 
cannot be rejected. In every country they 
find that an unexpected rise in the short-
term interest rates leads to a decrease in 
GDP and a gradual decrease in prices, 
however there is some heterogeneity in 
the size of the effects.
Ciccarelli, 
Rebucci 
(2006)
monthly data
1980:M1 - 1998:M12
Germany, 
France, 
Italy, 
Spain
VAR
(bayesian 
estimation)
- two steps: 
1) measuring 
monetary policy 
through a time-
varying SVAR;
2) modeling the 
transmission 
mechanism through 
a time-varying VAR.
1) SVAR:
endogenous variables: 
- short term interest rates of 
the 4 countries
exogeneous variables:
- (inflation - target inflation)
- (output - target output)
- (nominal exchange rate - 
target nominal exchange 
rate)
- Δ index of commodities 
price; - Δ M3; 
- US short term interest rate
2) VAR:
endogenous variables: 
- nominal exchange rate of 
ECU
- germany interest rate 
- spread over Germany 
money market interest rate
exogeneous variables:
- commodity prices; 
- US output index
The authors study, for the pre-EMU period, 
the transmission mechanism of a common, 
homokedastic monetary policy shock, 
identified as an innovation to the reaction 
function of the Bundesbank, in Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain. They find that the 
long-run cumulative impact on output of a 
common, homoskedastic monetary policy 
shock has decreased in all countries after 
1991. At the same time, cross-country 
differences in the effects of this shock 
have not decreased over time. The authors 
conclude that the transmission mechanism 
of European monetary policy is probably 
changing over time, albeit slowly and in all 
countries at the same time.
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Table 2 – Related literature overview (including post-EMU sample) 
 
Authors
Data frequency / 
Period
Sample Methodology Variables Main conclusions
Post-
EMU:
Weber, 
Gerke, 
Worms 
(2009)
quarterly data
1980:Q1 - 2006:Q4
lags=2
Euro Area 
(area wide)
VAR
- variables in levels
- shocks 
identification: 
Choleski; sign 
restriction [Uhlig 
(2005)];
- breakpoint tests: 
Chow tests; 
Ploberger, Kramer, 
Kontrus fluctuation 
test.
4 endogeneous variables: 
- real GDP
- GDP deflator
- indicator of real housing 
wealth
- domestic nominal interest 
rate (3M)
(inclusion of long term 
interest rate and money does 
not improve model)
2 exogenous variables:
- non-oil commodity price 
index
- US short term interest rate
The authors approach is to identify break dates in 
the Monetary Transmission Mechanism (MTM) of 
the Euro Area, independent of specific causes and 
then checking whether  MTM as a whole has 
changed. The authors find two break points, one in 
1996, another in 1999. The MTM in 1980-1996 is 
similar to the one in 1999 - 2006. There seems to 
have been an atypical interim period in 1996 - 1999. 
The comparisons on MTM are made first by visually 
comparing the Impulse Response Functions and 
then by estimating an extended VAR with period 
dummy and conducting tests for the coefficients of 
the dummys.
Boivin, 
Giannoni, 
Mojon 
(2009)
quarterly data
1980:Q1 - 2007:Q3
lags=3
Euro Area 
(area wide)
+
6 individual 
countries 
(biggest 
countries)
FAVAR
- the authors 
transform the series - 
they use y-o-y 
growth rates of all 
time series, except 
interest rates, 
unemployment and 
capacity utilization 
which are in levels.
33 economic variables for 
each country and the euro 
area, including:
- two interest rates, M1 and 
M3; - effective exchange 
rates; - index of stock prices
- GDP, deflator, PPI, CPI
- unemployment rate 
- hourly earnings, capacity 
utilization, retail sales and: 
- interest rates for USA, Japan 
and UK; - EUR/USD exchange 
rate; - index of commodity 
prices and the price of oil.
The authors find important heterogeneity across 
countries in the effect of monetary shocks before 
the launch of the euro. The creation of the euro has 
contributed to: 
1) a greater homegeneity of the transmission 
mechanism accross countries; 
2) an overall reduction in the effects of monetary 
shocks.
after 
subprime:
Cecioni, 
Neri 
(2011)
monthly  data:
Pre-EMU: 
1994:M1 - 1998:M12
Post-EMU:
1999:M1 - 2007:M7 
and
1999:M1 - 2009: M9 
(post EMU sub-
samples to test for 
subprime effects )
lags=4
quarterly data (to 
assess robustness 
of results ):
1989:Q1 - 2009:Q2 
lags=3
Euro Area 
(area wide)
SVAR and DGSE
(bayesian 
estimation)
- variables in levels
- shocks 
identification: 
recursive (Choleski); 
Sims e Zha (1999); 
sign restrictions 
[Uhlig (2005)].
SVAR: 
6 endogeneous variables: 
(monthly)
- industrial production
- HICP
- EONIA; 
- M2
- commodities prices
- nominal effective exchange 
rate
6 endogeneous variables: 
(quarterly)
- real GDP
- GDP deflator
- 1 month interest rate; 
- M2
- commodities prices
- nominal effective exchange 
rate
The autors do not search for structural breaks in the 
data, they assume that such a break may have 
ocurred in 1999:M1 with the creation of the EMU. 
They find: 
- SVAR: The effects of a monetary policy shock on 
output and prices have not significantly changed 
over time. Also there are no significant differences 
before and after the burst of the subprime turmoil. 
The authors claim that this cannot be the final word 
on the evolution of the MTM as changes in the 
conduct of monetary policy and the structure of the 
economy may have offset each other giving rise to 
similar responses of output and inflation to 
monetary policy shocks between the two periods. 
- DGSE: monetary policy has become more 
effective in stabilizing the economy as the result of 
a decrease in the degree of nominal rigidities and a 
shift in monetary policy towards inflation 
stabilization.
Peersman 
(2011)
monthly data 
1999:M1 - 2009:M2
lags=4
Euro Area 
(area wide)
SVAR 
(bayesian 
estimation)
- variables in levels
- shocks 
identification:  zero 
and sign restrictions
- breakpoint tests to 
test for stability: 
Quandt-Andrews, 
CUSUM, Chow.
6 endogeneous variables: 
- industrial production
- HICP
- volume of bank credit
- monetary base
- level of interest rate on 
credit
- level of the monetary policy 
rate
Macroeconomic effects of unconventional 
monetary policies (characterized by increasing the 
size of balance sheet or the monetary base) are 
similar to the effects obtained through innovations 
of interest rates. However, the transmission 
mechanism is different in terms of timings, 
interest rate spreads and credit multipliers.
Giannone, 
Lenza, 
Phil, 
Reichlin 
(2011)
monthly data
. 1991:M1 - 2008:M8 
(pre-subprime crisis 
to estimate model 
and study stilized 
facts)
. 1999:M1 - 2010:M3
(based on the 
previous time 
sample, the 
authors estimate 
previsions for this 
second sub-
sample) 
lags=13
Euro Area 
(area wide)
VAR
(bayesian 
estimation)
- variables in levels.
39 variables, including:
- macroeconomic, financial, 
monetary and credit variables 
plus a set of variables from 
the US to capture 
international linkages.
(for more detail please see 
table 1, pp. 6 of Giannone, 
Lenza, Reichlin (2012))
During the financial crisis 2007-2010 the ECB not 
only cut interest rates significantly but also 
introduced a package of non-standard monetary 
policy measures, intended to complement 
standard interest rate decisions, and not substitute 
them, with the aim to insure the effectiveness of 
the monetary transmission mechanism. The 
authors conclude that non-standard monetary 
policy measures introduced by the ECB following 
Lehman’s demise were successful in insulating, at 
least in part, the liquidity and credit conditions 
facing households and firms from the breakdown 
of financial intermediation seen in the interbank 
money market in late 2008, thus the stylised facts 
of the monetary transmission mechanism were 
observed.
7 
 
2.2. Fiscal policy, monetary policy and financial instability 
The effects of monetary policy on macroeconomic aggregates have been studied 
broadly, mainly by using VAR frameworks, or the New Keynesian DSGE models and 
some stylized facts have been identified as we have mentioned previously. Particularly 
for the Euro area, researchers have then turned their focus to the impact of the EMU on 
those stylized facts, and, more recently, on the functioning of the different transmission 
channels during the subprime and the sovereign debt crisis, as well as the effects of the 
unconventional monetary policy response to the crises. 
Conversely, when it comes to the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic 
aggregates, there are no stylized facts, i.e., there are no facts which are broadly agreed 
upon. The difficulties start on the basics: how to distinguish between a change in 
revenues and expenditures, caused by automatic stabilizers and a deliberate fiscal policy 
change. Afonso et al. (2011) present a comprehensive review of fiscal policy VAR-
related literature and they point out the different results that often arise when different 
identification schemes are used and also in cross-country samples.  
For instance, Afonso et al. (2011) use a Threshold VAR to study the effects of fiscal 
policy in high financial stress regimes and low financial stress regimes. They find that 
the response of economic growth to fiscal shocks is generally positive in both financial 
stress regimes and that financial stress has a negative effect on output growth and that it 
increases the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Their country sample
7
 also indicates that 
the initial conditions, such as, the existence of financial stress, diverse levels of 
government indebtedness and implicit monetary policy, are relevant in determining the 
nonlinearities that were found regarding the effects of a fiscal shock on economic 
activity. 
Interactions between financial system stress and monetary policy are also relevant. 
Stress in the banking sector, stock markets and exchange rate markets may play 
important roles in the transmission of monetary policy shocks.
8
 For example, Baxa et al. 
                                                          
7
 They estimate a TVAR for the US, UK, Germany and Italy. 
8
 In the case of the exchange rate, they may be more relevant for open economies, than for a large and 
relatively closed economy, such as the Euro area.  
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(2013) conclude that central banks, when faced with high financial stress, often alter the 
course of monetary policy, mainly by lowering interest rates and also that the size of the 
response varies overtime, as well as across countries.
9
 They also report some cross-
country heterogeneity with regard to the effects of specific types of financial stress. 
 
3. Econometric framework 
To analyze the effects of a monetary policy shock in the Euro area, we use a VAR 
model with the following representation: 
[1]  Zt = A(L)Zt-1 + μt,   
where Zt is the vector of endogenous variables, and ut is the vector of serially 
uncorrelated disturbances that have a zero mean and a time invariant covariance matrix. 
A(L) denotes a polynomial matrix in the lag operator. We also include a constant in the 
model. 
The vector of endogenous variables in our benchmark model consists of six Euro 
area variables: real GDP growth (yt), inflation (pt), annual change in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio (ft), long-term nominal interest rate (lt), short-term nominal interest rate (it) and a 
financial stress indicator (st): 
[2] Z t’= [yt   pt   ft   lt   it  st]. 
The inclusion of a debt sustainability indicator (proxied by the debt-to-GDP ratio) 
and a measure of financial stress, although not common in the monetary policy VAR 
related literature, will hopefully allow us to incorporate in the dynamics of our model 
two variables that historically, and possibly more markedly in (recent) times of 
economic and financial distress, may influence the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism.
10
 
We identify the monetary policy shocks by assuming a recursive (Choleski) 
structure. The variables are ordered as in [2], which reflects some assumptions 
                                                          
9
  Their sample includes the US, UK, Australia, Canada and Sweden. 
10
 Regarding this, see, as an example, our literature reviews on Afonso et al. (2011) and Baxa et al. 
(2013). 
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regarding the links between the economic variables. Specifically, we assume that the 
monetary policy shocks (i.e., the changes in short-term nominal interest rate – it) do not 
have a contemporaneous impact on output, prices, debt-to-GDP ratio and long term 
interest rates, but that they may contemporaneously affect the financial stress indicator. 
On the other hand, the policy interest rate does not respond to contemporaneous 
changes in the financial stress indicator. The ordering of the fiscal variable before 
output, follows Afonso et al. (2011), and is justified by the need to identify the effects 
of automatic stabilizers on the economy. The financial stress indicator is ordered last, 
which implies that it reacts contemporaneously to all variables in the system. 
The lag length of the endogenous variables, Zt, is an important aspect of the 
estimation procedure, as, if the lag length is too small, then the model may be wrongly 
specified and if it is too long, then degrees of freedom are being lost. The usual lag 
length selection criteria are presented in appendix A.3. The tests results indicate one lag 
for the Schwarz information criteria (SC) and two lags for Akaike (AIC) and Hannan-
Quinn (HQ) information criteria. The Akaike criteria may overestimate the lags, but the 
SC and HQ are consistent for small samples (Lutkepohl (2005)). We opt for one lag, 
mainly because the limited number of observations in the pre and post-EMU sub-
samples could impair the estimation of a six variable VAR, should more lags be 
considered. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 The data and variables 
We estimate the VAR model using quarterly data from Q1 1987 to Q4 2011. The 
source for the Euro area wide macroeconomic time-series was the 12
th
 update of the 
Area-Wide Model (AWM) database11, except for the case of the government debt for 
the Euro area, which was retrieved from the Quarterly Fiscal database for the Euro 
                                                          
11
 For a description of the model and dataset, see Fagan et al. (2001) and the respective statistical 
Appendix.  
10 
 
area.
12
 The financial stress index that we use for the Euro area, is the Composite 
Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS),
 
proposed by Halló et al. (2012)
13
, and the data was 
made available by the ECB. The time sample is limited, due to data availability. In 
particular, the CISS time series only starts in 1987 and the data from the latest available 
update of the AWM database stops in Q4 2011. 
For real GDP and the GDP deflator, we use the annual growth rates of the logs. For 
the debt-to-GDP ratio we use the annual change in the ratio. These transformations 
allow us to sidestep the known non-stationary characteristics of the original levels 
variables. Real GDP, GDP deflator and debt-to-GDP ratio are all seasonally adjusted. 
The monetary policy instrument is a three month nominal interest rate, as in Fagan et al. 
(2001). For CISS we computed the quarterly averages of weekly values.
14
 
4.2 Overview of macroeconomic, monetary, fiscal and financial developments15 
The average year-on-year growth rate of real GDP for the Euro in our sample was 
1.9%. During these 25 years there were two very marked recessions, the first one was in 
1993 and the second and deeper recession was in 2008-2009. Furthermore, smaller 
growth rates were observed in 2002-2003 and after the second Quarter of 2011.  
Regarding the annual change in the GDP deflator (our proxy for inflation), and long 
and short term interest rates, there has been a change in the levels of these variables, in 
the sense that, during the 90s, there was a decrease in the values from the considerable 
high levels observed in the end of the 1980s to more or less stabilized lower levels from 
1998 onwards.  
                                                          
12
 For a description of the database, please see Paredes et al. (2009). We use Euro Area general 
government debt, and then calculate the debt-to-GDP ratio, using the GDP provided in the AWM 
database. The resulting series has a very good match with the Eurostat debt-to-GDP ratio series for the 
Euro area, available only with data after Q1 2000. 
13 
The CISS is an indicator of contemporaneous stress in the financial system, proposed by Halló et al. 
(2012). Its main goal is to “measure the (…) current level of frictions, stresses and strains (or the absence 
of these) in the financial system and to condense that state of financial instability into a single statistic” 
(idem). It is a composite indicator, focused on the systemic dimension of financial stress, and comprises 
the five most important segments of an economy’s financial system: bank and non-bank financial 
intermediaries, money markets, securities (equities and bonds) markets and foreign exchange markets. 
For more details on the construction of the CISS, please refer to Halló et al. (ibidem). 
14
 In Appendix A.1 we present all the data and sources, in a systematic manner. 
15
 In Appendix A.2 we present the graphical representation of the time series of our variables. 
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The debt-to-GDP ratio for the Euro area has increase at a steady pace from just 
below 60% in 1987, to around 75% in 1996. From 1996 to 2008, the ratio has declined 
somewhat, attaining a level of 67% in 2008. After 2008, and related notably to the 
government’s response to the subprime crisis and also to the need to capitalize the 
banking sector, there was a very sharp increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio, which at the 
end of 2010 had already climbed to 86% of GDP. During 2011, the ratio continued to 
increase, albeit at a slower pace, closing the year at 88%. 
Finally, concerning the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress - our financial stress 
variable – we can observe a prolonged period of very high stress in the Euro area from 
Q3 2007 until the end of our sample in Q4 2011 (with slight improvements in Q3 2010 
and Q4 2010). The very high financial stress in this period is, on the one hand, due to 
the subprime crisis, whose first signs appeared during 2007 - namely with the decision 
by BNP Paribas on the 9
th
 of August, 2007, to stop the bail-out of three funds by BNP 
Paribas that were affected by the subprime problems - and was compounded by the 
failure of Lehman Brothers on the 15
th
 of September, 2008, resulting in the highest 
historical levels of CISS in Q4 2008 and Q1 2009. On the other hand, from the end of 
2009 onwards, the high levels of financial stress are mainly justified by the sovereign 
debt crises in Europe that followed the subprime crises. The first signs appeared on the 
yields of Greek sovereign bonds, whose rise led to the joint financial assistance program 
to Greece by the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB (the “Troika”), in May 
2010. Afterwards, the financial assistance program to Ireland also occurred in 
November, 2010, and another one for Portugal in May, 2011. Apart from the very high 
periods of stress after 2007, the rest of our sample have some other episodes of 
increased financial stress, albeit at comparatively lower levels, including the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992, the Russian crisis in 1998-1999, and a period 
of increased stress in 2001, following the events of the 9
th 
of September. 
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4.3 Empirical results  
We are interested in investigating whether there have been changes in the MTM, in 
association with the adoption of the Euro and also in the interactions between monetary 
and fiscal policy. To that end, we consider two balanced sub-samples: the first sub-
sample refers to the years prior to the adoption of the Euro, and runs from Q1 1987 to 
Q4 1998; the second sub-sample includes the post-Euro adoption years – Q1 1999 to Q4 
2011. The aim is to inspect the respective impulse response functions (IRFs) and to 
detect any differences that may exist between them.
16
  
Furthermore, we also explore the relevance of additional sub-samples, namely, a 
subprime and a sovereign debt crisis sub-sample. In order to do so, we exclude from the 
post-EMU sub-sample the final years - which correspond to the periods of these two 
crises. 
Our VAR model includes two macroeconomic policy variables – interest rate and 
debt-to-GDP ratio – and a financial stress variable. Therefore, it can be used to study the 
interactions of fiscal and monetary policy, on one hand, and of these two macro 
variables with financial stress, on the other hand. It is possible to study these 
interactions in our framework by basically analysing the impact of monetary shocks on 
the fiscal variable, as well as the impact of fiscal shocks on the interest rate and also the 
impact of financial stress on both variables (as well as on all the other non-policy 
related variables in our VAR). 
4.3.1 The effects of interest rates shocks 
The complete set of responses of the variables to the (negative) monetary shock, for 
all sub-samples, is shown in appendix A.4. The solid line depicts the median response 
estimate and the dashed lines show the two-standard error confidence intervals. For all 
sub-samples considered, the one-standard deviation monetary policy shock is estimated 
                                                          
16
 We implicitly assume that the adoption of the Euro in Q1 1999 may be a cause for a structural break in 
the monetary transmission mechanism. Another approach would be to test the data for the existence of 
such a break, as done by Weber et al. (2009), but our short time-sample limits the robustness of 
econometric testing for structural breaks. 
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to be around 30 basis points, which is in line with the estimate obtained by Peersman 
and Smets (2003). 
Comparing the pre-EMU and post-EMU sub-samples, we can observe a stronger 
response of the main macro-economic variables to a negative interest rate shock (i.e., a 
temporary increase in the short-term interest rate) in the post-EMU sub-sample. In 
particular, the output growth reacts more negatively in the first 8 to 10 Quarters, and 
then the recuperation of output growth occurs at a faster pace. Although there are 
differences in the amplitude of output growth response, the time frames over which 
these responses develop does not seem to differ significantly between the two sub-
samples - whilst in the pre-EMU sub-sample, the output growth turns positive after 
around 14 Quarters and in the post-EMU sub-sample, such recovery occurs after 12 
Quarters.  
With regards to inflation, there seems to be a somewhat bigger price-puzzle
17
 in the 
post-EMU sub-sample, than in the pre-EMU sub-sample. The negative response of 
inflation to an increase in interest rate seems to be of a similar scale, although in the pre-
EMU period, the response is somewhat more prolonged in time.  
Concerning the response of the fiscal variable, we observe a much higher increase in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio after a negative interest rate shock in the post-EMU sub-sample, 
than in the pre-EMU sub-sample. In fact, the increase in the annual change of the debt-
to-GDP ratio in the second sub-sample more than doubles that of the first sub-sample. 
The same pattern holds for the financial stress response – a negative monetary policy 
shock has a much higher impact on the financial stress variable in the post-EMU sub-
sample, than in the pre-EMU sub-sample. 
Overall, the changes in the responses of our VAR variables in the post-EMU sub-
sample are more significant for the fiscal and financial stress variables, than for output 
growth and inflation. These changes may be a consequence of a higher degree of 
synchronization of the Euro area countries’ economies after the adoption of the Euro. 
                                                          
17
 A price-puzzle is a price increase following a tightening of interest rates, which is a widespread feature 
in VAR literature. 
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However, if we exclude the Quarters after the beginning of the subprime crises from 
the post-EMU sub-sample , i.e., if our post-EMU sub-sample stops at Q2 2007, then 
IRFs are of a much smaller magnitude
18
 and, also, there is a very considerable price-
puzzle. As Peersman (2011) concluded, the policy response to the recession after the 
subprime crises seems to have improved the identification of conventional monetary 
policy shocks. In our paper we can further corroborate that this may have been the case, 
because our sub-sample which excludes the sovereign debt crisis, yields results that are 
much similar to the full sample results. Therefore, it was the subprime crises’ period, 
and not the sovereign debt crises’ period that contributed to improving the identification 
of conventional monetary policy shocks. 
4.3.2 The effects of fiscal shocks 
The complete set of responses of the variables to the positive fiscal shock, for all 
sub-samples, is shown in Appendix A.5. If we compare the period of Q1 1987 – Q4 
1998 to the period of Q1 1999–Q4 2011, the changes in the IRFs of our variables to a 
fiscal shock are substantial, not only in magnitude, but also in the directions of the 
responses. For instance, the response of output growth to a positive fiscal shock in the 
second sub-sample is negative in the first few quarters, whilst such an answer is positive 
in the pre-EMU sub-sample.  
These changes may be related to the Governments’ answer to the subprime recession 
– after the subprime crises there was a steep increase in governments’ debt-to-GDP ratio 
and this increase was accompanied by a deep recession. This idea is supported by the 
following: if we look at the estimates of the one-standard deviation fiscal policy shock, 
we conclude that such a shock was estimated to be around 0.3 percentage points (p.p.) 
in the pre-EMU period, but its estimate rose to more than 0.5 p.p. in the post-EMU sub-
sample. However, if we exclude the subprime period (and the sovereign debt crises 
                                                          
18
 Boivin et al. (2009) also find an overall reduction in the effects of monetary shocks after 1999, using a 
sample that does not include the subprime crises (their sample stops in Q3 2007). They conclude that 
“their model predicts that by removing an exchange-rate risk through the monetary union, and by having 
a central bank more decisively focused on inflation and output stabilization, the impact of monetary 
disturbances on measures of economic activity has been reduced, as observed in the data”. 
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period) – i.e., if we consider the Q11999- Q2 2007 sub-sample – the estimate of a one-
standard deviation fiscal policy shock comes down to just over 0.2 p.p.. The lower-than-
average real GDP growth, and higher-than-average annual increase in debt-to-GDP ratio 
that characterise the sovereign debt crises, may also be importantly related to the change 
in direction of the output growth response to a fiscal shock. 
In the pre-EMU sub-sample, the long-term interest rate responds with a steady 
increase to a positive fiscal shock, whilst the short-term interest rate responds with a 
slight decrease in the first few Quarters, followed by a prolonged increase. In the pos-
EMU sub-sample, both the short-term and long-term interest rate responses are negative 
in the first few Quarters, and then turn to slightly positive territory after about 15 
Quarters, albeit the scale of the fall, and posterior rise, of short term interest rate is 
comparatively higher. Therefore, a positive fiscal shock seems to be followed by a 
steepening of the yield curve in the short run, for both sub-samples.   
4.3.3  The effects of financial stress shocks 
The complete set of responses of the variables to financial stress shock, for all sub-
samples, is shown in Appendix A.6. As expected, the shocks are considerably higher in 
the post-EMU sub-sample, if we include the subprime and the sovereign debt crisis 
period. In the full post-EMU sub-sample, the one-standard deviation financial stress 
shock is estimated at around 45 points, whilst for the pre-EMU and post-EMU except 
subprime sub-samples, the estimates are similar, at around 30 points. 
Concerning the IRFs to a financial stress shock, by construction, there is no 
contemporaneous impact on the variables of our model. Comparing the pre-EMU sub-
sample with the Q1 1999–Q2 2007 responses, there seems to be a slight decrease in the 
magnitude of the responses of the macroeconomic variables in our model to a financial 
stress shock, but the pattern of such responses remains the same – small temporary 
increases in output growth and small temporary decrease in inflation, followed also by a 
temporary increase.  
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On the contrary, if we include the period of the subprime crises in the post-EMU 
sub-sample (i.e., if we consider the period Q1 1999- Q4 2009), then there has been a 
clear change in the magnitude and pattern of responses, with output growth responding 
in a strong and negative fashion to the shock, and debt-to-GDP responding with a strong 
increase in its annual change. Furthermore, including the sovereign debt crises period 
(i.e., considering the whole post-EMU period – Q1 1999 to Q4 2011) increases the 
negative response of output growth to the financial stress shock. Lastly, there is a 
positive response of the long term interest rate to a financial stress shock in all of the 
post-EMU sub-samples, which did not exist in the pre-EMU sub-sample. 
4.4. Robustness check: an alternative pre-EMU sub-sample 
Weber et al. (2009) found that there may have been a significant break point in the 
monetary mechanism period in the Euro area around 1996 and also some evidence for a 
second one around 1999, suggestive of an interim period from Q2 1996 to Q4 1998 of 
adjustment, prior to the Euro. Following that conclusion we estimate a VAR from Q1 
1981 to Q1 1996 and also the respective IRFs and then compare them with the post-
EMU sub-samples. 
The bulk of our conclusions remain valid. However, there is an interesting insight 
regarding the response of output growth to a fiscal shock. As it turns out, the alternative 
pre-EMU sub-sample, yields a decrease in output growth following a fiscal shock 
(albeit a small and temporary decrease), whilst the original pre-EMU sub-sample 
yielded a considerable positive and lasting response of real GDP growth to a fiscal 
shock. Yet the conclusion still holds – that the characteristics of the subprime and 
sovereign debt crises were the main drivers behind the changes in the responses of 
macro variables to a fiscal shock. 
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5. Conclusions 
The adoption of the Euro and of a single monetary policy might have contributed to 
changing the monetary transmission mechanism and the interactions between monetary 
policy, fiscal policy and financial stress in the Euro area.  
Our results indicate that the stylised facts of monetary transmission remain valid, but 
the response of output and, especially, of the fiscal and financial stress variables to an 
increase in the short term interest rate, seems to be stronger in the post-EMU period. 
These changes may be a consequence of a higher degree of synchronization of the Euro 
area countries’ economies after the adoption of the Euro. However, if we exclude the 
subprime crises from the post-EMU period, then the sizes of the responses are much 
smaller. Our results support Peersman’s (2011) conclusion that policy response to the 
subprime recession seems to have improved the identification of conventional monetary 
policy shocks.  
In addition, regarding fiscal and financial stress shocks, the inclusion in our post-
EMU sub-sample of the subprime and sovereign debt crises yields, changes in the scale, 
and also in the patterns of the responses of the main variables of our model. For 
instance, there is a very strong increase in the debt-to GDP ratio following a financial 
stress shock in the post-EMU period, whilst such a response was negative in the pre-
EMU period. Another important feature is the small magnitude of the IRFs of the post-
EMU period, when we exclude the subprime and sovereign debt crises. 
Overall, we find that the subprime and sovereign debt crises period has contributed 
markedly to the post-EMU impulse response functions and, if we exclude that period of 
financial turbulence from the post-EMU sample, then the responses of our VAR 
variables to monetary, fiscal and financial stress shocks are of a remarkably small 
magnitude. 
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Appendix 
A. 1 - Data description and sources 
Variables in the VAR model: 
yt  GDP, annual growth rate of the log of the real GDP (Y) used: yt = log(Yt) - log(Yt-4). 
pt   Price level (P), annual growth rate of logs used: pt = log(Pt) - log(Pt-4). 
lt    Long term interest rate. 
it   Short-term interest rate. 
ft   Annual change in the debt to GDP ratio: ft = Ft - Ft-4. 
st   Financial stress index (CISS), quarterly averages of weekly values. 
 
Sources: 
 
A. 2 – Data on the variables used in the VAR 
 
 
 
Variables Data Sources Periodicidade
Time sample 
availabitlity
Seasonally 
adjusted?
Series ID
Euro Zone
Y t GDP (real)
Area Wide Model Database 
- 12th update
quarterly 1980Q1-2011Q4 Yes YER
P t GDP deflator
Area Wide Model Database 
- 12th update
quarterly 1980Q1-2011Q4 Yes YED
l t Long term interest rate (nominal)
Area Wide Model Database 
- 12th update
quarterly 1980Q1-2011Q4 LTN
i t Short term interest rate (nominal)
Area Wide Model Database 
- 12th update
quarterly 1980Q1-2011Q4 STN
F t Debt/GDP
Quarterly Fiscal Database - 
ECB
quarterly 1980Q4-2012Q4 Yes MAL
S t
Composite Indicator of Systemic 
Stress
ECB weekly 1987-2013 CISS
-4
0
4
8
12
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
annual  chang e in debt- to-gdp ratio
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
short term interest rate
2
4
6
8
10
12
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
long term interest rate
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
deflator  inflation
0
200
400
600
800
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
financial stress indicator (ciss)
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
real GDP growth
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A. 3 – Lag selection criteria 
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: Y P F L I S      
Exogenous variables: C      
Sample: 1987Q1 - 2011Q4     
Included observations: 96     
    
        Lag AIC SC HQ 
    
    0  28.94277  29.10304  29.00755 
1  16.42683   17.54874*  16.88033 
2   15.76005*  17.84359   16.60225* 
3  15.85670  18.90186  17.08760 
4  15.99905  20.00584  17.61866 
    
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 AIC: Akaike information criterion   
  
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion     
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A. 4 – Effects of interest rates shocks 
 
Pre-EMU sub-sample: Q1 1987 – Q4 1998 
 
 
Post-EMU sub-sample: Q1 1999 – Q4 2011 
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Post-EMU, pre-subprime crisis sub-sample: Q1 1999 – Q2 2007 
 
 
Post-EMU, pre-sovereign debt crisis sub-sample: Q1 1999 – Q4 
2009 
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Alternative pre-EMU sub-sample: Q1 1987 – Q1 1996 
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A. 5 – Effects of fiscal shocks 
 
Pre-EMU sub-sample: Q1 1987 – Q4 1998 
 
 
Post-EMU sub-sample: Q1 1999 – Q4 2011 
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Post-EMU, pre-subprime crisis sub-sample: Q1 1999 – Q2 2007 
 
 
Post-EMU, pre-sovereign debt crisis sub-sample: Q1 1999 – Q4 
2009 
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Alternative pre-EMU sub-sample: Q1 1987 – Q1 1996 
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A. 6 – Effects of financial stress shocks 
 
Pre-EMU sub-sample: Q1 1987 – Q4 1998 
 
 
Post-EMU sub-sample: Q1 1999 – Q4 2011 
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Post-EMU, pre-subprime crisis sub-sample: Q1 1999– Q2 2007 
 
 
Post-EMU, pre-sovereign debt crisis sub-sample: Q1 1999 – Q4 
2009 
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Alternative pre-EMU sub-sample: Q1 1987 – Q1 1996 
 
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Response of Y to S
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Response of P to S
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Response of F to S
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Response of L to S
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Response of I to S
-10
0
10
20
30
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Response of S to S
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
